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I
THE TREND TOWARD UNIFICATION
IN 1915 Professor Kidd published a valuable and stimulating discus-
sion of the two forms of real property security existing in California
-the mortgage and the trust deed.1 After a lapse of twenty-three years
it has been thought worth while to investigate again the state of the
differences and similarities existing in the legal treatment of the two
instruments. In view of the present writers' indebtedness to Professor
Kidd's treatment of the subject, while the present discussion will be
made complete, its contribution can be only in the nature of a postscript
to Professor Kidd's scholarly article.
The paradoxical character of the situation in California was well
expressed by Professor Kidd as follows: 2
"... a court t'hich holds that no legal title passes to the mortgagee will
generally hold that no title passes when the conveyance is made to trustees.
... While in most jurisdictions there is little difference between a trust deed
and a mortgage, the courts of California, strangely enough where the lien
theory of mortgage has been adopted, have preserved trust deeds in which
the legal title actually passes. Both the lien theory and the legal title theory
have been made to work fairly well. When, however, the two theories are
simultaneously in operation in the same jurisdiction, difficulties are sure to
arise."
The present study will be limited to a detailed examination of the
state of the law in regard to the two instruments as it exists today. No
proposals for change in the law will be advanced. It may be observed,
however, that it is felt that a trend can be observed, in both the decisions
and the statutes of the state, toward a lessening of the distinction be-
tween the two types of instruments. There has not been an even progress
in this direction, the courts swinging back and forth between emphasis
upon the similarities and upon the differences in the rules of law ap-
plicable to the two instruments. Without citing the many statements of
conflicting points of view, it is believed that the following passages,
from an early and a late decision, are fairly illustrative of the general
current of the legal doctrine of the state. In 1859 it was said: 3
"It [a trust deed] has no feature in common with a mortgage, except that
it was executed to secure an indebtedness."
In 1933 is found the following: 4
"... . deeds of trust, except for the passage of title for the purposes of the
trust, are practically and substantially only mortgages with a power of
sale. ..."
I Kidd, Trust Deeds and Mortgages in California (1915) 3 CAIF. L. REv. 381.
2 Ibid. at 383, 384.
3 Koch v. Briggs (1859) 14 Cal. 256, 262, 73 Am. Dec. 651, 653.
4 Bank of Italy v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 657, 20 P. (2d) 940, 945.
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II
DIFFERENCES IN THE LAW RESULTING FROM THE DISTINCTION
1. Passage of Title.-The fundamental distinction between deeds of
trust and mortgages in California is that in the case of a mortgage legal
title does not pass from the debtor,5 whereas the converse is true in con-
nection with a trust deed.6 If this distinction were carried through to its
logical conclusion, there would be many more differences in the law re-
sulting from the distinction between the two types of instruments than
have been observed. Toward the close of this article the situations in
which the courts have ignored the passage of title in a trust deed will be
discussed.7 The immediate discussion will relate to the differences in the
law that have been found to result from the distinction between the two
forms of security.
2. Procedure to Effect Formal Discharge-The procedure required
to effect formal discharge of a mortgage differs from that necessary in
the case of a trust deed. A recorded mortgage may be discharged by an
entry in the margin of the record acknowledging satisfaction, or by
recording the mortgagee's certificate of discharge,8 but a reconveyance
of title is necessary in connection with a trust deedf The following
quotation aptly expresses the distinction:
"The instrument is a deed of trust ... and unless the indorsement upon the
margin of the record of the deed of trust constitutes a reconveyance, it
follows that the legal title remains in (the trustee]. By express statutory
provision the lien of a recorded mortgage may be satisfied by an indorse-
ment upon the margin of the record ... but such an indorsement is lacking
in all the essential elements requisite to a transfer of title." 10
3. Tender.-Because of the necessity of reconveyance in order to
formally extinguish a trust deed, it seems that a distinction as to the
5 California very early adopted the lien theory of mortgages. McMillan v.
Richards (1858) 9 Cal. 365, 70 Am. Dec. 655; Dutton v. Warshauer (1863) 21 Cal.
609, 82 Am. Dec. 765.
6Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Oakland Ry. (1924) 193 Cal. 451, 225 Pac. 452.
See Hollywood Lbr. Co. v. Love (1909) 155 Cal. 270, 100 Pac. 698.
t See infra, part III, Sm ramrs im THE LEoAL TrAT7iENT OF THE Two IN-
STRUMENTS.
8 CAr.. Civ. CoaE §§ 2938, 2939. Entering the discharge of a mortgage discharges
the security, but not the debt. Sherwood v. Dunbar (1856) 6 Cal. 53.
9 This is true, even though CAL. Civ. CODE § 2279 provides that "A trust is
extinguished by the entire fulfillment of its object, or by such object becoming im-
possible or unlawful," and CAL. Civ. CODE § 871 provides that "When the purpose
for which an express trust was created ceases, the estate of the trustee also ceases."
10 Roberts v. True (1908) 7 Cal. App. 379, 380-381, 94 Pac. 392, 393; Travelli
v. Bowman (1907) 150 Cal. 587, 89 Pac. 347; Duncan v. Wolfer (1922) 60 Cal.
App. 120, 212 Pac. 390; CAL. Civ. CODE § 871.
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effect of tender of performance exists. Section 1504 of the Civil Code
provides that a tender of performance has the same effect upon all the
incidents of an obligation as a performance thereof. Whether or not a
deed of trust should be considered an incident of the obligation which
it secures, as it is thus settled that performance by the debtor does not
extinguish the trust deed, the same result would seem necessarily to
follow in connection with a tender of performance. As to whether a
mortgage is discharged by a tender, the latest expression of the supreme
court of the state is to be found in Walker v. Houston:'1
"Some uncertainty exists as to whether tender discharges a mortgage, but
logically it should, for the mortgage is only a lien." 12
4. Effect upon the Creditor's Remedies of Running of the Period of
Limitation.-Section 2911 of the Civil Code provides that a lien is ex-
tinguished by the lapse of time within which an action can be brought
on the principal obligation.' 3 Since a mortgage is regarded as a lien, it
follows that when the period of limitation has run upon the principal
obligation, the mortgage is extinguished, and cannot be foreclosed.1
4
Neither can there be a sale under a power of sale contained in a mort-
gage where the note secured has been outlawed.'5 In the case of deeds
of trust, however, the trustee has legal title, and can always sell the
land, even after the statute has run on the note.16
Section 2911, relating to mortgages, was not designed, however, to
permit the debtor to recover his property without paying the debt, so
despite the expiration of the statutory period the mortgagor must pay
the debt before he can maintain ejectment, or quiet his title to the
mortgaged premises. 17
13(1932) 215 Cal. 742, 746, 12 P. (2d) 952, 953.
12Accord: Weimeyer v. Southern T. & C. Bank (1930) 107 Cal. App. 165, 290
Pac. 70. Contra: Himmelmann v. Fitzpatrick (1875) 50 Cal. 650. See Note (1915)
3 CAur. L. REV. 336.
13 It has been said that no other state has such a statute. Goldwater v. Hibernia
S. & L. Soc. (1912) 19 Cal. App. 511, 126 Pac. 861. But see MONT. REV. CODE (1935)
§ 9467.
11Kern Valley Bank v. Koehn (1910) 157 Cal. 237, 107 Pac. 111; Lilly-Brackett
Co. v. Sonnemann (1910) 157 Cal. 192, 106 Pac. 715.
15 Goldwater v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc., supra note 13; Faxon v. All Persons
(1913) 166 Cal. 707, 139 Pac. 919. In the Goldwater case, hearing in the supreme
court was denied on the ground that since the mortgagor had died before the mort-
gagee executed the power, and it no longer was a power coupled with an interest,
it terminated. That a mortgagee has a power coupled with an interest not ter-
minated by the death of the mortgagor before the statute of limitations has run,
see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Doane (1936) 13 Cal. App. (2d) 233, 56 P. (2d) 989.
16 Grant v. Burr (1880) 54 Cal. 298; Travelli v. Bowman, supra note 10. See
Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 395.
17 Puckhaber v. Henry (1907) 152 Cal. 419, 93 Pac. 114, 125 Am. St. Rep. 75.;
Cameron v. Ah Quong (1917) 175 Cal. 377, 165 Pac. 961.
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5. Assignments by the Creditor.-Section 858 of the Civil Code pro-
vides that the power of sale contained in a mortgage may be exercised
by an assignee of the note, provided the assignment is acknowledged and
recorded. The reason for this requirement is to make certain that after
foreclosure there will be a clear record title. Further, the mortgagor could
not safely redeem from one whose interest in the property was not indi-
cated by the record. These reasons are lacking in the case of a trust deed,
since no lien passes to the creditor, to be assigned by him, and legal title
remains at all times in the trustee. Consequently, an assignee of the
creditor can order the trustee to sell the property, without having had
his assignment recorded.' 8
Under a deed of trust, the creditor's assignee cannot himself sell the
property, because his assignor did not have a power of sale to transfer.19
In the case of a mortgage, however, the assignee of the note which is
secured can himself exercise the power of sale.20
6. Parol Trusts.-Apparently another difference in the law resulting
from the fact that title is not conveyed to the mortgagee, but only a lien,
has arisen in regard to parol trusts. The early case of Tapia v. DeMar-
tini l allowed the mortgagee to hold a mortgage in trust, by parol agree-
ment, in part for his own benefit and in part for the benefit of another.22
It would seem that a trustee could not hold the legal title which has been
conveyed to him in like manner, as to do so would constitute the impo-
sition of a trust in respect of real property by parol. This is upon the
assumption that the courts will apply to this situation section 1971 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, reading as follows:
"No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term
not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or
in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surren-
dered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance
or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent there-
unto authorized by writing."
7. Presentation of Secured Claim against Decedent's Estate.-A1-
though claims against decedents' estates founded on written instruments
I8 Stockwell v. Barnum (1908) 7 Cal. App. 413, 94 Pac. 400.
19 Ibid. See Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 399.
20 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 858. It is assumed that the mortgage contains an express
provision for private sale.
21 (1888) 77 Cal. 383, 19 Pac. 641.
22 Professor Kidd criticizes the reasoning of the Tapia case, and believes that
the decision should have been reached upon the theory that the debt is the prin-
cipal thing, and the security the incident, and that there is no prohibition against
declaring a parol trust in a debt. Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 399. If this reasoning
is correct, the same result could be reached in a situation involving a deed of trust
if the courts would recognize the security element of a deed of trust and ignore
the passing of legal title.
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secured either by mortgage or by deed of trust are filed and presented
in like manner,23 different results follow when claims so secured are not
filed or presented. With respect to claims secured by mortgage, section
716 of the Probate Code provides:
"No holder of a claim against an estate shall maintain an action thereon,
unless the claim is first filed with the clerk or presented to the executor or
administrator, except in the following case: An action may be brought by
the holder of a mortgage or lien to enforce the same against the property
of the estate subject thereto, where all recourse against any other property
of the estate is expressly waived in the complaint; but no counsel fees shall
be recovered in such action unless the claim was filed or presented as
aforesaid."
Inasmuch as no judicial action need be taken for a sale under a deed of
trust, these provisions do not apply. There is no penalty for failure to
file or present a claim secured by deed of trust,24 although of course if
payment by the estate of a claim for any deficiency remaining unpaid
after the trustee's sale is desired the claim must be presented.
8. Receivershlps.-A difference in the law relating to the two types
of security which is not based upon the passage of legal title has to do
with the creditor's right to a receiver. As to mortgages the court has no
jurisdiction to appoint a receiver except under section 564 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, and the parties to any form of instrument cannot
confer jurisdiction for the appointment of a receiver merely by stipula-
tion.2 In general, the mortgagee is entitled to a receiver during fore-
closure proceedings until the sale if he can make a proper showing under
section 564, subdivision 2,26 but he is not entitled to a receiver after
the sale except in unusual circumstances, either set forth in the code
or recognized by decisions, of which the following are examples:
(1) After judgment to preserve the property pending appeal;28
(2) After sale and during the redemption period, to satisfy a de-
ficiency judgment;2
2 3 CAL. PROB. CoDE § 706.
24 More v. Calkins (1892) 95 Cal. 435, 30 Pac. 583; Whitmore v. San Fran-
cisco Sav. Union (1875) 50 Cal. 145.
25Baker v. Varney (1900) 129 Cal. 564, 62 Pac. 100; Bank of Woodland v.
Stephens (1904) 144 Cal. 659, 79 Pac. 379; Lewis v. Shaw (1926) 77 Cal. App. 99,
246 Pac. 86.26 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 564 (2) provides that a receiver may be appointed:
"2. In an action by a mortgagee for the foreclosure of his mortgage and sale of the
mortgaged property, where it appears that the mortgaged property is in danger of
being lost, removed, or materially injured, or that the condition of the mortgage
has not been performed, and that the property is probably insufficient to discharge
the mortgage debt."
27 Reidy v. Young (1931) 119 Cal. App. 322, 6 P. (2d) 112.
2s CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 564 (4).
29 See Boyd v. Benneyan (1928) 204 Cal. 23, 26, 266 Pac. 278, 279. In support
of this dictun is cited Montgomery v. Merrill (1884) 65 Cal. 432, 4 Pac. 414, but
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(3) After sale, and during the redemption period, to prevent waste. 0
It is not proper to continue a receiver in possession to pay over the rents,
issues and profits to the purchaser under a mortgage, even though sec-
tion 707 of the Civil Code gives the purchaser the right to them.31 Nor
is it possible for the mortgagee to put a receiver in possession prior to
the institution of foreclosure proceedings. Section 564 of the Code of
Civil Procedure confers no such right. Further, there is no court action
available to the mortgagee by which he can acquire possession other
than foreclosure.3 2
Where a trust deed expressly gives the creditor or the trustee the
right to enter and take possession of the property, and collect and apply
the rents and income to the discharge of the indebtedness, the creditor
has the right to have a receiver appointed. 33 In Mines v. Superior Court,34
the supreme court said that such an action to recover possession and for
the appointment of a receiver is in the nature of a suit for specific per-
formance, and that, since specific performance is an equity proceeding,
the appointment of a receiver is proper under subdivision 7 of section
564 of the Code of Civil Procedure.35 After the trustee's sale, the pur-
chaser is allowed the remedy of unlawful detainer, and is entitled to a
receiver to take possession of the premises pending the final termination
of the action.36
The conclusion to be reached from these cases is that apparently
there are greater receivership possibilities in connection with properly
drawn deeds of trust than with mortgages, In the ordinary case of the
latter possession cannot be acquired prior to foreclosure, and then must
be returned to the mortgagor after the foreclosure sale during the re-
demption period,3 T whereas in the case of the trust deed, the receiver
this case is not in point because in it the receiver had acted prior to the sale, and
the crop of which he took possession was part of the mortgaged property. The
dictum in the Boyd case is approved, however, by dicta in First Nat'l T. & S. Bank
v. Staley (1933) 219 Cal. 225, 25 P. (2d) 982, and Reidy v. Young, supra note 27.
30 Hill v. Taylor (1863) 22 Cal. 191, where the mortgagor remained in posses-
sion after the sale and continued to mine gold.
31 Boyd v. Benneyan, supra note 29; Mau, Sadler & Co. v. Kearney (1904)
143 Cal. 506, 77 Pac. 411; West v. Conant (1893) 100 Cal. 231, 34 Pac. 705.
32 CA. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 744; Fogarty v. Sawyer (1861) 17 Cal. 589; Adams
v. Hopkins (1904) 144 Cal. 19, 77 Pac. 712.
33 Snyder v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co. (1934) 1 Cal. (2d) 697, 37 P. (2d) 86;
Isaacs v. Jones (1936) 12 Cal. App. (2d) 98, 54 P. (2d) 1123.
34 (1932) 216 Cal. 776, 16 P. (2d) 732. Accord: American Sec. Co. v. Van Loben
Ses (1933) 218 Cal. 662, 24 P. (2d) 499; Mercantile Mtge. Co. v. Chin Ah Len
(1935) 3 Cal. App. (2d) 98, 38 P. (2d) 806.
35 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 564 (7) provides that a receiver may be appointed:
"7. In all other cases where receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usages
of courts of equity."
3 6Pacific States S. & L. Co. v. Hoffman (1933) 134 Cal. App. 601, 25 P. (2d)
1006.
3 See supra notes 28, 29, and 30, for exceptional situations in which possession
need not be returned to the mortgagor.
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can acquire possession in accordance with its terms, and then retain
the property until possession is turned over permanently to the pur-
chaser at the sale.
9. Creditor's Actions for Relie.--The situation of the trust deed
beneficiary is less favorable than that of the mortgagee in regard to the
number of actions which may be required in order to secure complete
relief. If the debtor under a trust deed wishes to cause trouble, the
trustee's sale, accompanied by trustee's fees, is only one of several steps
that may have to be taken. It may be necessary, either prior to or after
sale, to bring an action in the nature of specific performance in order
to obtain the appointment of a receiver or to compel the performance
of provisions in the trust deed. Such a suit may be required in order to
collect rents, or to enjoin the commission of waste. There is a possibility
that the debtor may seek to enjoin the trustee's sale, and the creditor
will have to defend any such action. An unlawful detainer action under
section 1161a of the Code of Civil Procedure may be required in order
to obtain possession after the sale. Being a possessory action, title can-
not be tried in such a proceeding, and, in the absence of a prior specific
performance action, it may then be necessary to bring an action to quiet
title. Finally, if a deficiency judgment is desired, a special action must
be brought for this purpose. 38 These various possibilities confront the
holder of the trust deed, with the necessity of paying attorney's as well
as trustee's fees.39 Looking at the matter from a practical standpoint,
payment by the beneficiary of the trustee's fee for the sale does not
entitle him to the benefit of any legal counsel. It is to be expected that
as soon as the trustee is confronted with a point of legal difficulty, or any
doubtful question of responsibility, the beneficiary will have attorney's
fees to pay in addition, whether or not it is necessary to bring any
action.
If the security instrument is a mortgage, the single remedy of judicial
foreclosure takes the place of all these suits. The debtor can present all
38 If a necessity for such a judgment is felt, it will make some sort of suit
necessary in all cases after the trustee's sale. The deficiency judgment may be se-
cured in an equity proceeding also asking other relief. Of course, the beneficiary is
given the right (of which, as a practical matter, he may not be advised by the
trustee), to have the deed of trust foreclosed in the first instance in the same manner
as a mortgage, CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 725a, thus avoiding the necessity of having
both trustee's sale and deficiency judgment suit. See Note (1937) 25 CALIF. L.
REv. 347.
39 If the holder of a trust deed elects to foreclose it as a mortgage, the added
fee burden is not present. The creditor is then in the same position as one who took
a mortgage in the first instance. Further, if the holder of the trust deed refers the
matter to his attorney, the attorney can substitute himself as trustee to make the
sale, which will result to some extent in avoidance of duplication of fees. CAL. Cxv.
CODE § 2934a. See text to note 86, infra.
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his objections in his defense to this action, and equity will deny him the
possibility of any relief in a separate injunction suit.40 Under section 564
of the Code of Civil Procedure, as has been pointed out,4 ' in the fore-
closure suit a receiver may be appointed pending the sale. In connection
with the suit the summary remedy of writ of assistance may be used to
obtain possession.2 The foreclosure action is in the nature of a quiet
title suit, in that the claims of all parties and their privies are determined
by the decree.43 The deficiency judgment can be secured in the same
action.4
10. Restrictions on Sale Price.-The fact that a right of redemption
exists after a mortgage foreclosure sale, but not after a trustee's sale-
under a deed of trust, has created a difference between the two types of
instruments in regard to restrictions on sale price. The mortgagor may
sell his right of redemption, 4 and the purchaser upon exercising it pays,
not the amount of the debt secured by the mortgage, but the price the
property brought at the foreclosure sale, plus interest and costs.41 The
purchaser takes the property entirely free from the mortgage lien,48 and
without liability because of any deficiency judgment that may have been
entered against the mortgagor. 4 Therefore the mortgagee will generally
buy in the property at the foreclosure sale for the amount of the mort-
gage and costs, if the property, either presently or prospectively, is worth
that much. The debtor is thus protected from having the property bought
in at a low figure, and then being subjected to a large deficiency judg-
ment,5° as may occur, as will be pointed out, in connection with a deed
of trust. As an additional check on the sale price as to instruments exe-
cuted since 1933,51 there was in that year added a provision in section
40 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 526.
4 1 See supra note 26.
4 2 Hibernia S. & L. Soc. v. Lewis (1897) 117 Cal. 577, 47 Pac. 602, 49 Pac. 714;
Richardson v. Superior Court (1929) 101 Cal. App. 638, 281 Pac. 1077.
43 Arnoux v. Westphall (1932) 122 Cal. App. 476, 10 P. (2d) 133; McNutt v.
Nuevo Land Co. (1914) 167 Cal. 459, 140 Pac. 6.
44 CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 726.
45 See infra note 53.
46 CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 701.
47 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 702.
48 Upon redemption by the mortgagor him.nelf equity revives the mortgage
lien, subject to the granting of priority to all other incumbrances then existing.
The same rule applies upon reacquisition of the property by the grantor of a
trust deed who has not paid the debt secured. Barberi v. Rothchild (1936) 7 Cal.
(2d) 537, 61 P. (2d) 760, (1937) 25 CAi'. L. REV. 360.
49 Simpson v. Castle (1878) 52 Cal. 644.
5o The creditor usually purchases at the sale, because he has the amount of his
loan already invested in the property and need not produce any cash, crediting the
amount of his bid on the indebtedness. See Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 401.
51The effective date of the amendment to CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 726 was
August 21, 1933. See Notes (1932) 21 CAin'. L. REv. 471; (1933) 22 ibid. 170.
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726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing the court, either upon
application of the parties or upon its own motion, to appoint one of the
inheritance tax appraisers to appraise the property as of the time of
sale. The court then may render a money judgment against a defendant
personally liable for the debt for not more than the amount by which
the indebtedness exceeds the fair market value of the property. This
provision has been held unconstitutional as to mortgages existing at the
time of its enactment.52
After a trust deed sale, on the other hand, the purchaser has no fear
of a redemption, no matter how cheaply he may have bought in the
property. No right of redemption after such a sale exists,5 and the
following recent statement of the supreme court is in harmony with
repeated earlier holdings:5
"In California, it is a settled rule that inadequacy of price, however gross,
is not in itself a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee's sale legally
made."
It is true that as to instruments executed since 19335 the Legislature
has removed the incentive of increasing the amount of the deficiency
judgment as a motive for buying in the property at an inadequate figure.
Section 580a of the Code of Civil Procedure contains a provision for the
appointment of appraisers, in a deficiency judgment suit, similar to that
already discussed relating to mortgages, and a like limitation of the
amount of the judgment to the excess of the indebtedness over the fair
market value of the property. The section has been declared unconsti-
tutional as to instruments previously executed.56
If the holder of a trust deed sees fit to exercise the recently granted
privilege of having the instrument foreclosed in the same manner as a
5 2 Banta v. Rosasco (1936) 12 Cal. App. (2d) 420, 55 P. (2d) 601.
53 Sacramento Bank v. Alcorn (1898) 121 Cal. 379, 53 Pac. 813; Penryn Fruit
Co. v. Shermann-Worrell Co. (1904) 142 Cal. 643, 76 Pac. 484; Flabhrenbaker v.
E. Clemens Horst Co. (1930) 209 Cal. 7, 284 Pac. 905.
In Heney v. Heney (1926) 80 Cal. App. 301, 251 Pac. 841, a trust deed was
foreclosed, and it was held that there was no right of redemption. Contra: Hall-
Martin Co. v. Hughes (1912) 18 Cal. App. 513, 123 Pac. 617. Cf. Clemens v. Gregg
(1917) 34 Cal. App. 245, 167 Pac. 294, where a trust deed was by consent of parties
treated as a mortgage and foreclosed, with the right of redemption; Tonningsen v.
Odd Fellows Ass'n (1923) 60 Cal. App. 568, 213 Pac. 710, where an instrument
which provided that it was either a deed of trust or a mortgage was foreclosed.
In the latter case it was held that there was a right of redemption, the instrument
for the purposes of the case being treated as a mortgage.
5 Stevens v. Plumas Eureka Annex Min. Co. (1935) 2 Cal. (2d) 493, 496,
41 P. (2d) 927, 928. Accord: Baldwin v. Brown (1924) 193 Cal. 345, 224 Pac. 462;
Engelhertson v. Loan & Bldg. Ass'n (1936) 6 Cal. (2d) 477, 58 P. (2d) 647.
55The exact date is August 21, 1933.
56 Central Bank v. Proctor (1936) 5 Cal. (2d) 237, 54 P. (2d) 718.
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mortgage,5 7 then the debtor receives the same protection that he would
have if a mortgage had been executed in the first instance.5 s
11. Possibility of Redemption.-In the discussion of the preceding
point it has been noted that unless the holder of a trust deed elects to
foreclose it in the manner applicable to mortgages there is no right of
redemption.5 9 The mortgagor, on the other hand, is given the statutory
year of redemption after a sale which is provided for as to execution
sales by section 700a of the Code of Civil Procedure. °
The point is so important that it merits separate statement as a dif-
ference between the two instruments. Absence of redemption under trust
deeds not only bears upon the amount at which the creditor will buy in
the property, along the line of earlier discussion,"' but deprives the
trustor of the added year accorded the mortgagor within which to retain
possession of his propertyP2 During the year the debtor who has given a
mortgage may make a final effort to fulfill the obligation which he has
assumed, and permanently preserve his home or other property.
57 CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 725a.
58 The statute is specific that foreclosure is "subject to the provisions, rights
and remedies relating to the foreclosure of a mortgage upon such property." This
subjects the purchaser to the same fear of a redemption by a purchaser of the equity
of redemption if he has bought in the property cheaply. While the provision for
foreclosure as a mortgage is constitutional as to preexisting instruments, Lincoln
v. Superior Court (1934) 2 Cal. (2d) 127, 39 P. (2d) 405, as with mortgages the
limitation upon the amount of the deficiency judgment can be applied only to in-
struments executed thereafter (the effective date being Sept. 15, 1935). Wilson v.
Superior Court (1935) 8 Cal. App. (2d) 14, 47 P. (2d) 331.
59 Kent v. Laffan (1852) 2 Cal. 595; McMillan v. Richards, supra note 5, fur-
ther stating that the right of redemption after foreclosure had become a property
right. See Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 387. As to the right of redemption after sale
under a power of sale in a mortgage, the case of Cormerais v. Genella (1863) 22
Cal. 116, expressed a doubt whether such a right would exist. See also Sacramento
Bank v. Alcorn, supra note 53, at 384, 53 Pac. at $14; Commercial etc. Co. V. Superior
Court (1936) 7 Cal. (2d) 121, 129, 59 P. (2d) 978, 982. But see Arnoldy, Right of
Redemption from Sales of Property under Power of Sale (1936) 11 Los ANoELEs
BAR BuL. 321, where it is stated, without citation of authority, that "It is difficult
to perceive why sales of property made in the exercise of a power of sale should not
be subject to this right of redemption." The fact that the power of sale mortgage
is not widely used in California has been attributed to the Cormerais case, supra,
where, in addition to the question as to the existence of the right of redemption after
such a sale, it was doubted whether under a mortgage a sale could be made other
than by judicial foreclosure. See Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1. For discussion of
further reasons for the failure to make use of powers of private sale in mortgages
in this state see infra, Part III, (4). Validity and Efficacy of Grant of Power of
Private Sale.
60 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2931.
01 See text supra, Part II, (10). Restrictions on Sale Price.
6 2 The mortgagor is entitled to possession during the redemption period. Mau,
Sadler & Co. v. Kearney, supra note 31; Purser v. Cody (1898) 120 Cal. 214, 52
Pac. 489; Peterson v. Jurras (1935) 2 Cal. (2d) 253, 40 P. (2d) 257; First Nat'l
T. & S. Bank v. Staley, supra note 29.
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Throughout the history of the statesa public policy has been felt to
require that the mortgagor should be given this protection. As early as
1625 the Courts of Chancery had developed the remedy of strict fore-
closure" for the same reason, and redemption has been a principle of
equity jurisprudence ever since. It is true that under California statutes
the trustee's sale can not be had on the day of maturity of the obliga-
tion,65 but there seems to be no reason why to the great extent which
still exists debtors should be placed in two categories, depending upon
their selection of one or the other of two instruments as identical in their
function and as similar in their nature as those now under discussion.
III
SIMILARITIES IN THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF THE
TWO INSTRUMENTS
1. Right to Court Foreclosure.-Since 1915, the date of Professor
Kidd's excellent survey, the courts have ironed out a number of the dif-
ferences formerly existing between the two types of securities. At that
time there was a doubt whether or not the remedy of judicial foreclosure,
which was normally used when the creditor held a mortgage, could be
used when the creditor's security was a trust deed.60 In 1933 the holder
of a trust deed was expressly given the benefit of this remedy by the
addition of section 725a to the Code of Civil Procedure.
As applied to trust deeds previously executed, in Lincoln v. Superior
Court67 it was held that the statute was constitutional, only a matter of
remedy being involved. However, the effect of the decision is weakened
by the further observation of the court that since the trust deed con-
tained a clause which authorized any necessary action or proceeding by
any of the parties, the remedy of foreclosure was a proper one under the
contract. It nevertheless seems clear that foreclosure of all trust deeds
will be permitted under the statute.
2. "But One Action" Rule.--Much discussion in the past has hinged
upon the peculiar California "but one action" rule contained in section
63West v. Conant, supra note 31.
645 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY Or ENGLISH LAW (1924) 330; Emanuel College v.
Evans (1625) 1 Chan. Rep. 18.
65 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2924 provides: (a) that notice of default must be filed;
(b) that not less than three months must elapse; and (c) that notice of sale must
be given as under CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 692 (20 days) before the trustee may sell.
It has recently been decided that the three months period and the 20 day period
may run concurrently. Bennett v. Ukiah Fair Ass'n (1936) 7 Cal. (2d) 43, 59 P.
(2d) 805.
G0 Herbert Kraft Co. v. Bryan (1903) 140 Cal. 73, 73 Pac. 745. See Kidd.
op. cit. supra note 1, at 389.
o7Supra note 58; Note (1935) 9 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 65.
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726 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section provides that there can
be but one action upon any right secured by a mortgage, and that this
action must be foreclosure, including sale of the property, but contains
no statement in regard to deeds of trust. In Powell v. Pattison,68 decided
in 1893, it was held that the same rule applied to deeds of trust, i.e., that
a personal judgment could not be had until the security had been legally
exhausted. Dicta in later cases cast some doubt on this holding, and it
was remarked in one case that the decisions cited in the Powell case all
concerned mortgages, and that for that reason it was not considered
authority.69 Whatever distinction may have existed in this connection
was wiped out in 1933 by Bank of America v. BentleyY° In that case it
was decided that "either by reason of implied agreement or by reason of
public policy," in the absence of unusual circumstances, the possible
nature of which is not discussed in the case, it is not permissible to sue
on a promissory note secured by a deed of trust without first exhausting
the security or showing it to be valueless.7 1 This rule, which, it was stated,
had been decided by the Powell case and had become a rule of property,
was thereafter codified, and now appears as the last sentence in section
580a of the Code of Civil Procedure.7 2
3. Negotiability of Instrument Secured.-Because of the necessity of
foreclosure as the means of collection, under section 726 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, notes secured by mortgages were held to be non-nego-
tiable,73 as calling for the performance of an act other than the payment
of money. Notes secured by deeds of trust were also held to be non-
negotiable because of uncertainties as to the amount to be paid and the
date of payment created by the various trust provisions, and the con-
tingent character of the obligation.74 In 1923 section 3265 of the Civil
Code, being section 148 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,
was amended by the insertion of the following clause:
08 (1893) 100 Cal. 236, 34 Pac. 677.
69Herbert Kraft Co. v. Bryan, supra note 66. See Commercial Nat'l Bank v.
Catron (1931) 50 F. (2d) 1023; Hodgkins v. Wright (1900) 127 Cal. 688, 692, 60
Pac. 431; Sacramento Bank v. Copsey (1901) 133 Cal. 663, 665, 66 Pac. 8, 205; Smiley
v. Watson (1913) 23 Cal. App. 409, 414, 138 Pac. 367; Kidd. op. cit. supra note 1,
at 391; Notes (1932) 5 So. CALIF. L. Rav. 227; (1923) 12 CArF. L. REV. 307;
(1932) 20 CAar. L. REv. 318.70 Supra note 4, at 658, 20 P. (2d) at 945.
71 Although CA. Con Civ. PRoc. § 726 does not in terms authorize a suit on
the obligation, instead of foreclosure, in the event that the security becomes value-
less, it has been so construed. J. I. Case Co. v. Copren Bros. (1916) 32 Cal. App.
194, 162 Pac. 647; Ferry v. Fisk (1921) 54 Cal. App. 763, 202 Pac. 964.
7 2 See Notes (1934) 8 So. CALI. L. REv. 35; (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REV. 347.
73 Meyer v. Weber (1901) 133 Cal. 681, 65 Pac. 1110; Notes (1930) 3 So. CAL.
L. REv. 335; (1932) 5 So. CALIF. L. REv. 227.
74 Central Say. Bank v. Coulter (1925) 72 Cal. App. 78, 236 Pac. 956; CAL.
Crv. CoD § 3082. See Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 394; Note (1930) 3 So. CALIF.
L. REV. 335, 340.
(Vol. 26
19381 MORTGAGES AND TRUST DEEDS IN CALIFORNIA 219
".... but the negotiability of a promissory note otherwise negotiable in
form, secured by a mortgage or deed of trust upon real or personal prop-
erty shall not be affected or abridged by reason of a statement therein that
it is so secured, nor by reason of the fact that said instrument is so secured
nor by any conditions contained in the mortgage or deed of trust securing
the same.'
This amendment leaves open the question as to whether negotiability
is affected by provisions in the nature of a mortgage or deed of trust
inserted in the note itself. It would seem that the amendment should be
interpreted to cover this situation in furtherance of the legislative policy
to establish the negotiability of secured instruments. The problem should
be regarded as one of two instruments upon the same piece of paper and
over the same signatures.
4. Validity and Efficacy of Grant of Power of Private Sale.-The
usual method of taking advantage of the security under a deed of trust
is by exercise of the power of private sale granted by the instrument it-
self. Mortgages generally contain a similar power of private sale, but
there never has been a widespread use of the power in this state. Four
explanations may be offered. First, the early case of Cormerais v. Gen-
ella75 expressed a doubt as to whether under a mortgage a sale could be
made other than by judicial foreclosure; second, there seems to have
been a doubt as to whether the power of sale was coupled with an in-
terest so as to survive the death of the mortgagor; 7 third, it seems to
have been once thought that a deficiency judgment was not available
after a private sale under a power in a mortgage; 77 and finally, there has
been a doubt as to whether or not there was a right of redemption after
such a sale.78
These doubts as to the validity and efficacy of the grant of a power
of private sale in a mortgage have now been dispelled. The Civil Code
expressly recognizes the power of private sale.79 It has been decided that
the power survives the death of the mortgagor,80 and that a deficiency
judgment may be had after such a sale."' As to the possibility of a right
of redemption following such a sale, the express recognition of powers
of private sale under mortgages in the Civil Code, without reference to
75 Supra note 59.
76 See Goldwater v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc., supra note 13; New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Doane, supra note 15.
77 This contention was made in 1. I. Case Co. v. Copren Bros., supra note 71;
Commercial etc. Co. v. Superior Court, supra note 59.
78 See Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 388.
79 CAL. Civ. CODF § 2932, commented on in Commercial etc. Co. v. Superior
Court, supra note 59.
80 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Doane, supra note 15. But cf. cases cited supra
note 15, where statute of limitations had run.
81 J. I. Case Co. v. Copren Bros., supra note 71; Commercial etc. Co. v. Superior
Court, supra note 59.
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redemption, would seem to be sufficient to remove any doubt on this
score.S2 It must be remembered, however, as already pointed out, that
limitation will run against the exercise by the mortgagor of the power
of private sale, whereas the legal title conveyed to the trustee remains
good, permitting sale by him at any time.
5. Private Sale by Agent.-A distinction was formerly thought to
exist with respect to the possibility of having a private sale conducted
by an agent. It was early decided that the mortgagee did not need to
be present at a sale under a power of sale contained in a mortgage, but
that such a sale might be conducted by his agent.s  The trustee, however,
was thought to occupy a fiduciary relation, and, it was therefore held,
had to be present at the trustee's sale.84 In 1929 section 2924a was added
to the Civil Code, under which the trustee's attorney may conduct the
sale. In addition, in Orloff v. Pece8 5 it was said:
"Without regard to ... [Civil Code section 2924a] a trustee may employ
an agent to do the ministerial act of auctioning the property."
6. Substitution of Party to Make Private Sale.-A closely connected
question is that of substitution of another party to make a private sale.
Section 858 of the Civil Code allows an assignee, when the assignment
is acknowledged and recorded, to act under a power of private sale con-
tained in a mortgage, but because of the fiduciary position that the
trustee has been thought to occupy, it has been said that the trustee
must personally execute his trust.8 6 This difference, if it existed, has now
been removed, through the addition of section 2934a to the Civil Code
in 1935. This section authorizes the beneficiary to substitute a trustee
in a deed of trust where the trustee has no duties to perform other than
those incidental to the power of sale. The section has not as yet been
construed. The provision seems clearly to relate only to a matter of rem-
edy, and to be constitutional as to preexisting instruments. The trustee,
often designated without his knowledge, has given no consideration, and
would seem clearly to have no vested right, either to the land or to the
office of trustee. It should be immaterial to the debtor who holds the se-
curity title. The title companies have taken the position, however, that
82 See Cormerais v. Genella, supra note 59; Sacramento Bank v. Alcorn, supra
note 53, at 384, 53 Pac. at 814; Commercial etc. Co. v. Superior Court, supra note
59, at 129, 59 P. (2d) at 982. As to whether elimination of the right of redemption
in this way is consistent with the character of mortgages, see 3 JONES, MORTGAGES
(8th ed. 1928) 788, 838; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) 340.
83 Fogarty v. Sawyer (1863) 23 Cal. 570.
84 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (5th ed. 1894) § 1862. Kidd, op. cit. supa note 1, at
384, criticises this view.
85 (1933) 134 Cal. App. 434, 436, 25 P. (2d) 484. Accord: Harris v. Seidell
(1934) 1 Cal. App. (2d) 410, 36 P. (2d) 1104.
SO See supra note 84.
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until the matter is adjudicated they will not issue a policy of title insur-
ance upon preexisting instruments where there has been a substitution
of trustees.
7. Enforcement of Security During Bankruptcy Proceedings of
Debtor.-It is a question of current interest, not yet worked out thor-
oughly in the decisions, just what steps may validly be taken by security
holders during bankrupcty proceedings of the debtor, without the neces-
sity of intervening therein and thus subjecting themselves to the payment
of trustee's and referee's fees. There seems to be no reason to believe
that there will be any difference in the rules applicable to mortgages and
deeds of trust. Without going into the matter fully here, it seems that
as to both forms of security the following either have been or are in
process of being settled as the governing principles:
(1) Judicial foreclosure proceedings may be instituted during bank-
ruptcy proceedings only with the consent of the bankruptcy
court 87
(2) Judicial foreclosure proceedings instituted prior to commence-
ment of the bankruptcy proceedings may be prosecuted to con-
clusion unless restrained by the bankruptcy court.88
(3) Unless restrained by the bankruptcy court, a valid sale under
private power may be had at any time during the bankruptcy
proceedings8 9
8 7 
saacs v. Hobbs Tie & Lumber Co. (1931) 282 U. S. 734. A doubt has been
expressed, in which the present writers do not concur, as to whether a bankruptcy
court can grant such consent to a state court. Bierce, New Beacons in Bankruptcy
(1932) 37 Comm. L. J. 183, 185. That such consent can be granted, see Title &
Trust Co. v. Wernich (C. C. A. 9th, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 811, 812; Comer v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A.8th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 413, 415.
In the text it is assumed that the creditor is not in possession. The writers in-
dine to the view that if possession is lawfully secured prior to the commencement
of bankruptcy proceedings consent of the bankruptcy court is not required, by
analogy to pledge sales. As to pledge sales: Hiscock v. Varick Bank (1906) 206 U.S.
28, 40; In re Hudson River Nay. Corp. (C. C.A.2d, 1932) 57 F. (2d) 175, 176;
Kerr v. Southwestern Lumber Co. (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 348, 349, cert. den.
(1935) 296 U. S. 611. But see, as to pledge sales: Cherry v. Insull Utility Invest-
ments (D. C. IMI., 1932) 58 F. (2d) 1022, 1026, rev'd on other grounds, sub. nom.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress (C. C.A. 7th, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 329. The specific
provision in section 57 (h) of the Bankruptcy Act (30 STAT. (1898) 560, 11 U. S.
C. A. § 93 (h)) in regard to "securities" weakens'the force of the analogy.
88 Straton v. New (1931) 283 U. S. 318. In this case the suit in the state court
was commenced more than four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion, to enforce liens acquired through legal proceedings, but it is believed that these
facts are relevant only from the standpoint of validity of the liens.
89 Robinson v. Kay (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) 7 F. (2d) 576 (mortgage); Heffron v.
Western Loan & Building Co. (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 301, cert. den. (1936)
299 U. S. 597 (deed of trust) ; Hardt v. Kirkpatrick (C. C.A. 9th, 1937) 91 F. (2d)
875 (deed of trust). But see Comer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra
note 87.
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8. Duty of the Creditor to Effect Formal Discharge.-Section 2941
of the Civil Code provides that when a mortgage is satisfied the mort-
gagee must, on demand, execute a certificate of discharge, or enter satis-
faction of record. This section, by its terms, applies only to mortgages,
but does not give rise to a distinction between the two types of instru-
ment, as the same result is reached in connection with a trust deed.
Under the decisions, upon payment of the debt the trustor is entitled to
a reconveyance in order to clear the record title,90 although by statute,
when the purpose for which the trust was created terminates, the estate
of the trustee ceases.9 '
9. Miscellaneous.-As already remarked, if the courts had pursued
to its logical conclusion the conception that legal title passes from the
debtor in the case of a trust deed, and does not so pass in the case of a
mortgage, many more differences in the law would have been developed
as the result of the distinction between the two instruments. In many
situations, however, the passage of title upon the execution of a deed of
trust has been ignored, with the result that the two classes of security
transactions have been treated in like manner.
For example, the debtor after execution of a trust deed may still de-
clare a homestead upon the property. 2 The later execution of a trust
deed does not constitute an abandonment of the homestead, except as
to the security transaction itself, even though section 1243 of the Civil
Code provides that a homestead is extinguished by a grant of the land.08
Neither the trustee nor the mortgagee need give notice of non-responsi-
bility under the mechanic's lien lawY4
Despite the passage of title to the trustee, the trustor can execute a
second trust deed; 95 he retains an interest that is subject to attachment
It seems somewhat paradoxical that without the consent of the bankruptcy
court a private party can do what a state court cannot. The explanation is to be
found, of course, in the relative functions of the two systems of courts.
Section 75 (o) of the Bankruptcy Act (47 STAr. (1933) 1473, 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 203 (o)) provides a temporary limitation upon the statement in the text.90 Travelli v. Bowman, supra note 10; Herbert Kraft Co. v. Bryan, supra note
66; Savings & Loan Soc. v. Burnett (1895) 106 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. 922.
91 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2279, 871.
92 King v. Gotz (1886) 70 Cal. 236, 11 Pac. 700. See Bank of America v. Bent-
ley, supra note 4.
9a MacLeod v. Moran (1908) 153 Cal. 97, 94 Pac. 604.
914Williams v. Santa Clara Min. Ass'n (1884) 66 Cal. 193, 5 Pac. 85; Holly-
wood Lbr. Co. v. Love, supra note 6. For the purpose of establishing priority of
liens under CALu. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1186, the deed of trust is considered a lien.
Fickling v. Jackman (1928) 203 Cal. 657, 265 Pac. 810; Waxco C. & C. Co. v.
Coffee (1931) 117 Cal. App. 298, 3 P. (2d) 588; Miller v. Citizens T. & S. Bank
(1932) 128 Cal. App. 295, 16 P. (2d) 999.
95 This was done in Barberi v. Rothchild, supra note 48.
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and execution,96 has an estate of inheritance under the McEnerny Act,97
and finally has not violated a sole and unconditional ownership clause
in an insurance policy. 8
In numerous other instances there is no difference in the treatment
of trust deeds and mortgages. Under either type of security the debtor
is entitled to possession, in the absence of special agreement,99 and after
either mortgage foreclosure or trustee's private sale, unlawful detainer
is allowed as a remedy to remove the person in possession.'00 The doc-
trine of after acquired title applies to both types of instruments, that
is, if the debtor acquires title after the execution of the security instru-
ment, the after acquired title inures to the benefit of the mortgagee or
trustee as security for the obligation in like manner as though it had been
acquired before execution.1 10 Likewise the doctrine of instantaneous seizin
applies to both types of transactions, that is, a purchase money incum-
brance has priority over any instrument executed by the vendee before
he purchased the property.10 2 If either the mortgagor or trustor reac-
quires the property after foreclosure or private sale, all liens or trust
96Kennedy v. Nunan (1877) 52 Cal. 326; Lynch v. Cunningham (1933) 131
Cal. App. 164, 21 P. (2d) 154; Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 394.
07 Warren Co. v. All Persons (1908) 153 Cal. 771, 96 Pac. 807.98 Krone v. Insurance Co. (1933) 218 Cal. 556, 24 P. (2d) 459. Of course the
execution of a mortgage by the insured does not violate such a clause. Lee v. United
States Fire Ins. Co. (1927) 55 Cal. App. 391, 203 Pac. 774.
0 Mortgages: CAL. Civ. CODE § 2927; Lord v. Morris (1861) 18 Cal. 482;
Paladine v. Durchman (1932) 216 Cal. 212, 13 P. (2d) 731; Ely v. Williams (1907)
6 Cal. App. 455, 92 Pac. 393.
CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 744 provides: "A mortgage of real property shall not
be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the mort-
gage to recover possession of the real property without a foreclosure and sale." This
statute was designed to take from the mortgagee, in the absence of any agreement
as to possession, the right to possession, which right was an incident of a mortgage
at common law. Fogarty v. Sawyer, supra note 32.
Trust Deeds: Meadows v. Snyder (1930) 209 Cal. 270, 286 Pac. 1012; Snyder
v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co. (1934) 1 Cal. (2d) 697, 701, 37 P. (2d) 86, 88, where
it is said that the court must apply "the same rules as to the rights of the trustee or
the beneficiary to possession of the premises as are applicable by statute in the case
of a mortgagee, whose rights to possession, whether before or after default, are
controlled by the agreement, or the consent otherwise of the mortgagor, express or
implied."
100 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1161a (1), (2). The debtor is entitled to possession
during redemption, however, so that a difference may arise on this ground. Mau,
Sadler & Co. v. Kearney, supra note 31. See text to note 60, supra, et seq.
'
01
.fortgages: CAL. Civ. CODE § 2930; Jensen v. Duke (1925) 71 Cal. App. 210,
234 Pac. 876; Schelling v. Thomas (1929) 96 Cal. App. 682, 274 Pac. 755.
Trust Deeds: Younger v. Moore (1909) 155 Cal. 767, 103 Pac. 221. See (1937)
25 CALir. L. Rav. 360.
102 Mortgages: CAL. CIV. CODE § 2898; Tolman v. Smith (1890) 85 Cal. 280,
24 Pac. 743.
Trust Deeds: 1 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 799, § 585.
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deeds, which had been wiped out by the original sale, are revived. 10 3
Either type of instrument may be used to secure future advances, 0 4
and both are unenforceable if without consideration. 10 The transfer of
the note secured will effect the transfer of either without further as-
signment. 0 6
Deeds of trust generally contain a provision that recitals of notice,
default, etc., are conclusive in favor of the purchaser, while a mortgage
ordinarily does not contain such a provision.'0 7 Such a stipulation is un-
necessary in a mortgage, as the foreclosure judgment, constituting res
Judicata and clearing the title, especially when coupled with the pre-
sumptions in favor of the regularity of proceedings on which a judgment
is based,' 08 protects the purchaser at the mortgage foreclosure sale much
more fully than the recitals protect the purchaser at the trustee's sale.109
'
0 3 See supra note 48.
301 Lumber & Buildings Sup. Co. v. Ritz (1933) 134 Cal. App. 607, 25 P. (2d)
1002.
105Mortgages: Muir v. Hamilton (1908) 152 Cal. 634, 93 Pac. 857; Briggs v.
Crawford (1912) 162 Cal. 124, 121 Pac. 381; National Hardware Co. v. Sherwood
(1913) 165 Cal. 1, 130 Pac. 881. But see 2 JONES, MORTGAoES (8th ed. 1928) 11, § 756.
Trust Deeds: CAr.. CIv. CODE § 2280; Wheat v. Big Pines Lime, etc. Co. (1921)
55 Cal. App. 654, 204 Pac. 43. See More v. Calkins, supra note 24; Hayward Lbr.
Co. v. Naslund (1932) 125 Cal. App. 34, 13 P. (2d) 775.
IOGMortgages: Savings & L. Soc. v. McKoon (1898) 120 Cal. 177, 52 Pac. 305.
Trust Deeds: Lewis v. Booth (1935) 3 Cal. (2d) 345, 44 P. (2d) 560, where the
court refers to the trust deed as a lien.
107 Kidd, op. cit. supra note 1, at 390.
IOS Bank of Com. T. Co. v. Kenney (1917) 175 Cal. 59, 165 Pac. 8.
109 Recitals are conclusive against the trustor in favor of the purchaser when
the deed of trust so provides. Mersfelder v. Spring (1903) 139 Cal. 593, 73 Pac. 452;
Jose Realty Co. v. Pavlicevich (1913) 164 Cal. 613, 130 Pac. 15; Sorensen v. Hall
(1934) 219 Cal. 680, 28 P. (2d) 667; Carpenter v. Smallpage (1934) 220 Cal. 129,
29 P. (2d) 841. Such recitals are not necessary, to the validity of the sale. Where
there are recitals, and the deed of trust is silent as to their effect, they are prima
facie evidence of the facts recited, Savings & L. Soc. v. Deering (1885) 66 Cal.
281, 5 Pac. 353; but, in the absence of special facts, will not be treated as conclusive
against the trustor. Seccombe v. Roe (1913) 22 Cal. App. 139, 133 Pac. 507 (between
parties to the deed); Jose Realty Co. v. Pavlicevich, supra, (third party having
notice of the fraud). Cf. Central Say. Bank v. Lake (1923) 62 Cal. App. 588, 217
Pac. 563, where the trustee was empowered to substitute a trustee, and it was stipu-
lated that the recital of such action was to be conclusive. The substituted trustee's
deed contained a recital of his substitution. It was held that this recital was not
evidence of the fact of substitution. It was stated that recitals to be taken as evi-
dence are "those recitals which are set out in the acts done in the exercise of the
power, such as notice, sale and the like. They are, necessarily, recitals of acts done
by the trustee in the exercise of his power. ... The only evidence of the substituted
trustee's status as a trustee is his own recital of it."
A recital in a deed given under a power of sale contained in a mortgage was
held conclusive in favor of an innocent purchaser against the grantor and his privies.
Simson v. Echstien (1863) 22 Cal. 580.
[Vol. 26
19381 MORTGAGES AND TRUST DEEDS IN CALIFORNIA 225
Nor Js a distinction taken as to who can purchase at a sale of the prop-
erty-either the trustee, beneficiary or mortgagee may buy in the prop-
erty."10 The procedure required in connection with either instrument
for the exercise of the power of private sale is the same."' Finally, the
existence of either a trust deed or a mortgage will defeat the right to an
attachment in an action upon the debt secured." 2
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110 Trustee: Copsey v. Sacramento Bank; Herbert Kraft Co. v. Bryan, both
supra note 66; Shimpones v. Stickney (1934) 219 Cal. 637, 28 P. (2d) 673.
Beneficiary: Felton v. LeBreton (1891) 92 Cal. 457, 28 Pac. 490, where the
property was conveyed to a creditor in trust to sell and pay the debt. Held: that in
cffect this was a mortgage with a power of sale, and that the trustee-beneficiary was
in the same position as a mortgagee in an ordinary mortgage. Billings v. Farm
Development (1925) 74 Cal. App. 254, 240 Pac. 298.
Mortgagee: Gartlan v. Hooper & Co. (1918) 177 Cal. 414, 170 Pac. 1115.
III CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.
112 CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 537. See Note (1937) 25 CALF. L. REv. 469, 473.
